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Abstract: Despite anchoring the Irish monetary system to a common zone-wide exchange rate and
interest rate, EMU has triggered sizeable exchange rate and especially interest rate shocks to the
Irish economy (albeit not appreciably greater than those experienced under previous exchange
rate regimes). Interest rate movements have deviated widely from what a standard Taylor
monetary policy rule would have counselled – though here again the deviations have been no
worse in this regard than those of the previous regime. The most important shock has been
associated with the large and sustained initial fall in nominal interest rates as EMU began.
Through mechanisms which we formally model, the interest rate fall has had a lasting effect on
property prices, construction activity and the capacity of the labour market to absorb sizeable net
immigration, despite a sharp deterioration in wage competitiveness since 2002. As the long
drawn-out impact of this shock subsides, the failure of the wage-bargaining system promptly to
claw back the loss of competitiveness resulting from exogenous exchange rate movements is
increasingly likely to show up in weaker aggregate employment performance.
I INTRODUCTION
Has Ireland’s entry into EMU in 1999 tended to destabilise the economy?It could have done so in two ways, first by increasing the scale and
frequency of exogenous shocks hitting the economy, and second by suppressing
some shock absorbers in the system, placing more pressure elsewhere. In both
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cases, the primary transmission channels are exchange rate and interest rate
movements. Prior to EMU entry, the nominal interest rate in Ireland was
endogenous in the national economy and subject to national policy influence –
as indeed was the nominal exchange rate to some extent. As such, they could
in principle represent a fast-adjusting part of the system’s adaptive capacity.
Now, in EMU these key variables are exogenous and cannot be relied upon as
a lubricant, to move in a stabilising manner when the Irish economy is hit by
idiosyncratic shocks. Not only that: there is also the potential for exogenous
movements in interest rates and in the effective exchange rate to operate as
destabilising forces. 
This concern is no longer an abstract one. Indeed the first years of the new
system, marked by extremely rapid real economic growth, and by a decline in
unemployment to record lows, also saw a sharp procyclical decline in real
interest rates and in the effective exchange rate index. Shocks which are not
absorbed by insulating interest rate and exchange rate movements, or which
are the consequences of destabilising movements in these rates, may show up
in other prices or in quantities.1 The major elements here include real wage
rates, unemployment and migration, property prices and construction activity,
and – an element largely ignored in this paper – fiscal aggregates. Of these,
migration and property prices tend to be neglected in the international macro-
adjustment literature, but they have clearly been important in Ireland 
(cf Fitz Gerald, 2001, Leddin and Walsh, 2003). Of course, there are channels
through which EMU membership may have had a stabilising effect.
Expectations of exchange rate movements and medium term inflation –
previously a source of instability2 – have become insensitive to domestic
developments. 
The paper looks both at whether the exogenous exchange rate and interest
rate have had the effect of increasing the scale and frequency of exogenous
shocks hitting the Irish economy, and at how key variables in the remainder
of the economy – the share of construction in total employment, house prices,
inward migration and labour competitiveness – have responded to the largest
of these shocks. We find that exogenous exchange rate shocks to the Irish
economy are sizeable, but not much more so than under previous regimes. We
confirm that interest rates have not moved in line with a stabilising monetary
policy for Ireland – though again the deviations have been no worse in this
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1Although, as pointed out by Flood and Rose (1995) there has been little empirical evidence that
fixing exchange rates increases the volatility of real variables.
2For two decades pre-EMU such expectations were on average for a higher-than-realised
depreciation and surged in response to certain configurations of domestic and international
shocks, resulting in high ex post international interest rate differentials (Honohan, 1993;
Honohan and Conroy, 1994; Walsh, 1993).
regard than those of the previous regime. The most important shock has been
associated with the large and sustained fall in nominal interest rates. This has
been reflected in property prices, construction activity and the capacity of the
labour market to absorb sizeable net immigration, despite a sharp
deterioration in wage competitiveness since 2002.
Although the paper touches on a rather wide range of Irish macroeconomic
topics, we were struck by the fact that in each area, Brendan Walsh’s
contributions represent a central part of the literature. In so many instances
his early contributions pioneered the application of modern economic analysis
to Irish topics, as for example, on econometric modelling (Walsh, 1970);
migration (Walsh, 1974); exchange rate regimes (Walsh, 1984) and so on. We
welcome the opportunity to add a few bricks to an edifice that Brendan has
done so much to build over the past four decades.
Section II contains a brief general overview of Ireland’s experience to date
in EMU, highlighting the key exogenous shocks – the initial fall in interest
rates, the two-way swing in the external value of the euro, and the
international slow-down following the bursting of the technology bubble – and
the response of the Irish economy, with sustained migration, continued house
price inflation and only a modest dip in real output growth. Section III
assesses the impact of the change in exchange rate regime on the nature and
magnitude of exogenous shocks, looking separately at exchange rate and
interest rate movements. The next two sections consider the endogenous
(market) response of other key domestic variables to these and other shocks.
Using a simple theoretical model of short-run dynamics, Section IV illustrates
the potential role of migration and the property market in amplifying and
prolonging the impact of shocks such as the initial interest rate decline.
Section V proceeds to look at the empirical evidence for these two price and
quantity adjustments in two key markets: those for residential property and
for labour documenting in particular the continuity in the relation between
cross-channel unemployment differences and migration and focusing on the
evolution of labour competitiveness – where we find that wage determination
has not been a stabilising force either. Section VI contains concluding remarks.
II OVERVIEW OF IRELAND’S EXPERIENCE IN EMU
2.1 The Regime Change
Following a period of controlled floating within the very wide ERM bands
(1993 to 1998), Ireland dissolved its independent currency in the single euro
currency of the multi-country European Monetary Union in January 1999.
Thus at the time of writing, Ireland has had no independent currency for over
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seven years, or about half as long as the lifetime of the narrow-band ERM
(1979-1992). This is a period sufficiently long to begin to provide some
information about the magnitude of shocks and the economy’s reaction to
them. 
In terms of the macroeconomic policy environment, abandonment of an
independent currency entails the removal of two policy instruments, the
nominal interest rate and the exchange rate, both of which could be used to
offset shocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that both variables could
be subject to suboptimal policy, whether because of technical failings or
because of inherent problems of time inconsistency. 
The particular choice of alternative currency also matters: if the adopted
currency proves stable against the main trading partners, then shocks induced
by third-country exchange rate movements will be minimised. In the case of
the euro, all exchange rate shocks are clearly reduced against other countries
using the euro and those adopting a fixed peg against the euro. However, much
of Ireland’s trade and financial affairs are with countries that have not
adopted or pegged to the euro, most notably the UK, the US (together with
countries pegged de facto with the US dollar including up to 2005 China – now
Ireland’s third largest non-EU trading partner) and Japan.
The preconditions for Ireland’s adoption of this regime were not
unambiguously favourable. While the macroeconomic situation at the outset
was quite good, with unemployment falling, the public finances in surplus and
cost-competitiveness conditions favourable,3 the structural pattern of trading
and investment relations was much less so, with only 19 per cent of
merchandise imports and 42 per cent of exports coming from initial EMU
members in 1998.4 A clear and crucial initial impact, making itself felt before
the exchange rates were irrevocably locked, was the sharp once-and-for-all
drop in nominal interest rates. A clear benefit to the economy in the long term,
this has had a decisive medium-term effect on subsequent macroeconomic
developments, not all of it favourable. 
2.2 World Macroeconomic Changes and Ireland’s Response, 1999-2004
At first sight, and in terms of the average major macroeconomic indicators,
Ireland’s experience in EMU has been an unalloyed success: real GNP growth
has averaged 5.7 per cent per annum, average unemployment was 4.4 per
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3So favourable, indeed, that a small – and perhaps inadequate – upward revision in the ERM
central rate had been engineered in the months preceding EMU’s start.
4The first six years of EMU showed a small decline in this percentage for exports, and only a
modest increase to 21 per cent for imports. Instead, the share of the US in Ireland’s exports
continued to expand and that of the UK to decline. 
cent, the current account balance of payments deficit has averaged less than 
1 per cent of GDP per annum and even inflation – clearly the least successful
area of the four – can be considered moderate, with the CPI growth coming in
at 3.7 per cent per annum on average. 
Admittedly, this average data tends to gloss over the activity slowdown
from the heady growth rates and falling unemployment of 1999-2000 – which
may be considered the last two years of the Celtic Tiger (Leddin and Walsh,
2003) – to the more modest, but still respectable, output and employment
achievements of 2001-4.5 The growth slowdown can be related to the series of
shocks, external and internal, which hit the economy from mid-2000. Among
the shocks were the peaking of the dot.com bubble, followed by the US
recession and reduced growth in most EU markets, the aftermath of the 9/11
events and the run-up in commodity prices, especially petroleum; an
additional, more local, factor was the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in 2001
with consequences for agriculture and tourism. Annual inflation too, displayed
a cyclical pattern, surging to a high of 5.6 per cent in 2000, fuelled by the rise
of the US dollar and sterling against the euro, before falling to about 2 per cent
by 2004.6
This mild nature of the slowdown and the subsequent speedy recovery –
albeit not to “Tiger” levels – seems to suggest that one of the main anticipated
costs of EMU entry, the fear of “prolonged recession” and the inability to adjust
to asymmetric shocks, were not entirely justified. The interesting question,
however, is whether the recovery was due to the efficient working of internal
policy or market mechanisms or rather to fortuitous external or domestic
factors (Leddin, 2004)? 
This paper will not attempt a detailed discussion of countercyclical fiscal
policy, but it would clearly be hard to argue that fiscal policy was actively
stabilising. Although loss of the nominal instruments is generally held to
create a need for heavier reliance on countercyclical fiscal policy, this lesson
does not seem to have been put into effect in Ireland so far. Irish fiscal policy
has been largely procyclical during the EMU years, as the government has
tended to expand spending in line with revenue during the boom years and
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5Even in 2002, real GNP growth was as high as 2.7 per cent and by 2003 it had recovered to 5.1
per cent before slowing somewhat to 4.0 per cent in 2004, still close to likely long-term potential
growth.  However, unemployment started rising for the first time in a decade. Interpretation of
the macroeconomic aggregates is complicated by some sharp revisions in these annual growth
rates between successive issues of National Income and Expenditure, and of course there is the
continuing difficulty of interpreting the level and especially the annual changes of net factor
income. Data on trends over 2-3 years may be more stable and reliable.
6The currency movements had a larger effect on Ireland than on any other EMU country, because
of Ireland’s relatively close trade and investment links with the US and UK (Honohan and Lane,
2003; 2004).
curtail spending during the downturn. Indeed, with the reversal of the dollar
and other adverse shocks, Ireland finds itself with less fiscal leeway than if it
had held a tight belt in the over-heating period 1999-2000. 
III INTEREST AND EXCHANGE RATE SHOCKS: HAVE THEY
INCREASED IN THE NEW REGIME?
Prior to EMU entry, the major predicted change was a decline in the level
and volatility of real interest rates and the danger of an increase in the trade-
weighted exchange rate – at least relative to other available exchange rate
regimes (Baker et al., 1996). In this section we show that exchange rate
volatility has not clearly increased but that, though nominal interest rate
volatility has fallen, the interest rate has not proved to be a stabilising force. 
3.1 Third Country Exchange Rate Movements
Use of the euro stabilises Ireland’s nominal exchange rate but only against
partner countries that make up a minority of trade. Given that the euro’s
exchange rate against third countries is negligibly affected by Irish conditions,
the first question is whether this has resulted in a more or less volatile trade-
weighted nominal exchange rate in practice and whether it has been
associated with a more or less appreciated nominal exchange rate on average.
(Here we are taking the nominal exchange rate movements as the shock; the
endogenous response of wages is discussed in Section V).
Figure 1 displays a long time series of the nominal effective (trade-
weighted) exchange rate index (NEER), from which it is evident from that this
slipped to record low levels during the run-up to, and the first two years of
EMU. Since 2002, however, it has recovered sharply to reach levels last
recorded in 1997. Overall, the new exchange rate regime has delivered in
nominal terms a weaker exchange rate on average (index of 62.0) than
previous regimes (ERM narrow band: 67.4; ERM wide band: 66.5). (The
opposite is true of the real exchange rate, as will become evident below).
The evolution of volatility can be measured in various ways. We discuss
two representative measures of the volatility of the nominal trade-weighted
exchange rate index: standard deviations of the quarterly level and of the
change (first difference) of the index. Figure 2 plots a twelve-quarter moving
standard deviation of each and illustrates the fact that there have been
several waves of heightened volatility over the years.
Measured in terms of standard deviation of levels, there have been two
surges in Irish nominal trade-weighted exchange rate volatility during EMU
and, as shown in the Figure, these were as high as anything experienced for
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almost a quarter century. Measured separately for the three regimes, the
narrow band period proves to have the highest standard deviation at 4.1 per
cent – reflecting the many realignments – the wide band period has the lowest
at 2.3, with EMU so far intermediate at 3.2. 
Measured in terms of changes, volatility during EMU has been lower than
at most periods in the past.  This standard deviation over the EMU period
comes out at 1.2 per cent, as compared with 1.3 for the wide-band ERM period
and 1.7 for the narrow band (1.4 if the realignments are removed – see below).
However, for the other small EMU countries, the reduction in NEER volatility
following EMU entry has been much more striking.7 This contrast reflects the
greater importance of the continued volatility of the euro against sterling and
the US dollar – in the latter case the volatility has increased relative to the
Irish pound/US dollar rate in the floating period. 
Modelling the evolution of the exchange rate as a random walk with time-
varying variance (a GARCH model), with dummies in the variance process
model for different regimes, suggests that, while variance may have been
somewhat higher in the ERM, it is not significantly lower in the EMU period.
Not surprisingly, the fit of any such equation is very poor, and even the ERM
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Figure 1: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate for Ireland 1979-2004
Source: Bank of England (average of the last month of each quarter; to mid-2002);
Central Bank of Ireland (trade-weighted competitiveness index – nominal; since mid-
2002).
7Indeed, for the other small EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Netherlands and
Portugal, using the moving 12-quarter standard deviation of (log-)changes as the benchmark, the
most recent volatility (to end-2004) is at or close to (less than 44 per cent above) the minimum
observed 1981-2004, whereas for Ireland the latest observation is at more than 130 per cent above
the minimum. 
dummy in the variance equation is not significant even at the 10 per cent level
(details shown in the Working Paper version, i.e., Honohan and Leddin, 2005). 
Overall, this evidence suggests that high frequency nominal exchange rate
volatility has not been higher in EMU (and might even have been somewhat
lower). An important additional consideration must be borne in mind. Some of
the volatility in pre-EMU times reflects realignments8 in which the exchange
rate was consciously adjusted in a stabilising way. These movements cannot
be considered as shocks, but rather as corrective adjustments. So some of the
volatility in changes in the ERM is “good” volatility. Indeed, removing the
exchange rate changes in the quarters of the three largest realignments for
Ireland (March 1983, August 1986 and January 1993) dramatically alters this
picture and removes most of the apparent reduction in volatility since EMU
began (Honohan and Leddin, 2005). We look at this in more detail below in the
discussion of competitiveness.
On balance, then, the data do not point to an improvement as between
EMU and previous regimes in regard to exchange rate volatility. This is
despite the elimination of bilateral exchange rate changes with all the EMU
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Figure 2: Volatility of Nominal Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data of Figure 1.
8Also related to realignments is the fact that the change in exchange rate is negatively skewed 
(–0.68) in the full period, but not in the EMU period, when skewness is close to zero (+0.06). The
skewness in the ERM period presumably reflects the negative jumps at times of realignment.
These tend to increase measured variance in the quarterly data, whereas they are absent from
EMU, and are likely to be the main reason why variance increases in EMU when measured in
levels but not when measured in changes.
members, and despite the expectation of some that exchange rate volatility
would decline in net terms. Ireland certainly did not benefit from the sizeable
reduction in exchange rate volatility experienced by other EMU members with
the arrival of the new regime. On the other hand, it is hard to point to evidence
of a major increase in volatility emanating from this source.
3.2. Interest Rate Levels and Dynamics: Have they Become Less Stabilising?
Over the period 1999-2004, the average real interest rate in Ireland was
–0.9 per cent. Adding to the effect of the sharp decline in nominal interest
rates here was the rise in inflation during 1999-2002. Spurring spending, as it
did, especially in the construction sector, the fall in nominal rates itself likely
contributed to inflation. The experience dramatically illustrates how the
adoption of an exogenous nominal interest rate not only removed the potential
for this instrument to be used as a countercyclical tool, but also induced a pro-
cyclical element because of the fact that, absent a policy response, a rise in
inflation automatically generates a fall in real interest rates.
Now that nominal interest rate movements are externally determined,
movements in them represent shocks to the system; but have they become
more stabilising or more destabilising on average? This question can be
divided in two9: First, how close at each date have actual interest rates been
to those that would have been adopted by an optimising autonomous monetary
policy (the ‘levels’ question)? Second, has the loss of policy independence led to
interest rates being less responsive to inflation and output movements (the
‘slope” question)?
The widely-used Taylor rule provides a framework to answer both
questions, though it is used in different ways. The Taylor rule is a simple
formula setting the nominal short-term interest rate as a linear function of
inflation rate and the output gap.10
ii = α + β(πi – π*) + γ(yi – y*)
When inflation exceeds its target value, the interest rate is increased; if
the output gap is negative, it is reduced. In the literature, πt and yt are either
assumed to be the current values, or the authorities’ projected future values,
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9A third relevant question is whether the volatility of real or nominal interest rates has declined.
Here the empirical answer is clear: there has been a decline in nominal interest rate volatility in
the EMU period. Real interest rate volatility was, however, lowest in the floating rate period 
1994-1998.
10See Adalid et al. (2005) (for the Euro area), Dupor and Conley (2004) (for the US) and Kuttner
(2004) as examples of the many recent attempts to compare actual interest rate movements to
Taylor rule predictions.
for actual inflation and the output gap. In addition, there may be smoothing,
with the authorities preferring not to jump immediately to the interest rate
indicated by the equation.
The Taylor rule does not necessarily define a true optimal interest rate: it
neglects, for example, the fact that the authorities will often hike interest
rates to defend a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate peg. It is best thought of
as a useful benchmark summarising the combined demands of output and
inflation stabilisation on the monetary authorities. Using the formula to
deduce the benchmark requires several practical decisions. First we need to
know the parameter values; second, we need to know what data is available to
the authorities regarding current and projected inflation and output gap, and
whether smoothing is carried out (cf Faust et al., 2001 who also argue that
Ireland’s interest rates were too low in 1999-2000). There is also the issue of
whether producer or consumer prices are more relevant.
To answer the ‘levels’ question, we assume that optimal policy corresponds
to the Taylor rule with standard parameters. Using this formula, we calculate
a normative time series for the nominal interest rate that should prevail at
each moment (conditional on the actual inflation and output gap), and
compare this with actual interest rates.11 Figure 3 shows an interest rate
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Figure 3: Nominal Interest Rates: Actual and Warranted by Taylor Rule
Based on short-term interest rate and output gap series from OECD Economic Outlook
77, June 2005; using parameters α = 4; β = 1.5; γ = 0.5.
11The calculations do not pretend to represent for the EMU period the interest rates that would
have prevailed had monetary independence been retained.
series computed using contemporaneous values of CPI inflation and the OECD
output gap, Taylor’s original parameter values for β and γ, and a constant term
set to ensure that the mean value of the normative and actual series over the
sample period are equal. The main features are that the Taylor interest rate
is much higher than actual before 1984; it then dips below the actual and
remains there until 1998. In the EMU period the Taylor rule generates much
higher interest rates for Ireland than were actually observed. This long swing,
interest rates too low before 1983, too high between then and the EMU, and
too low since is neither quantitatively negligible, nor highly sensitive to the
assumed parameters of the Taylor rule. The actual and Taylor plots cross at
just two points, which thus define three interesting subintervals. The swing in
the difference between actual and Taylor values is from an average of minus
1,254 basis points before 1979-1982; plus 430 basis points 1983-97; and minus
400 basis points 1998-2004. (Experiments with a range of alternative standard
parameter values for β and γ that have been proposed in the literature reveal
that the qualitative pattern of differences between normative and actual
interest rates is the same for a wide range of parameter values; see Table 1).12
Figure 3 suggests two complementary conclusions. First, by this reckoning
nominal interest rates in EMU have been far too low for Ireland, allowing
inflation to surge despite strong output performance. But the second
conclusion suggested by Figure 3 is that nominal interest rates missed the
mark by at least as wide a margin in the earlier periods also.13 Was monetary
policy inappropriate then also, albeit in the opposite direction, with interest
rates too high during the later part of the ERM period? Excess returns against
the anchor currency of that adjustable peg exchange rate regime averaged
over 2 percent per annum for two decades, surging when the exchange rate
peg was being protected against short-term realignment speculation, and
remaining high in calmer times also (Honohan and Conroy, 1994). Real
interest rates were much higher too, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Turning to the ‘slope’ question, instead of simply comparing a time series
of normative interest rates with actual, we now examine the short-run
correlation of Irish interest rates with inflation and the output gap.
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12In Honohan and Leddin (2005), we show that Ireland has the distinction of a higher variance in
the gap between Taylor rule and actual interest rate than any of the other twelve small countries
for which the same data is available, other than Greece. Furthermore, Irish interest rates have
averaged further below the Taylor rule value than in any other of these countries since the EMU
began.
13This statement hinges on the value of the intercept α, assumed to be 4 per cent, a value which
results in the average gap between Taylor and actual of close to zero. Regardless of the exact value
of the intercept we may say that either interest rates were too high before, or too low, since EMU
began, or both.
Specifically, we assess whether actual Irish interest rates in either ERM,
floating or EMU periods can be modelled as a Taylor-type function of inflation
and output, albeit with nonstandard parameters. This provides an alternative
perspective on the degree to which Irish interest rate movements might still
have been somewhat countercyclical. If the estimated coefficient on inflation
is greater than unity, real interest rates will have acted in a stabilising
manner with regard to inflation (subject to the output gap). But the exogenous
nominal interest rate generated for Ireland by EMU membership could have
induced a destabilising or procyclical real interest rate dynamic unless Irish
inflation was sufficiently closely correlated with that in the rest of the EMU
zone. 
Some simple regression estimates of a Taylor-type equation are presented
in Table 2.14 While crisp and robust results do not emerge, the estimates
provide little indication that interest rate movements in Ireland have
responded to inflation and output gaps in a manner consistent with a
stabilising monetary policy. 
When the equation is estimated over the whole period since the ERM crisis
of 1992-3, neither inflation nor the output gap is significant (Regression 2).15
If a second order autoregressive process is added, some significance is obtained
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Table 1: Taylor Rule Less Actual Short-Term Interest Rate, Various Periods,
Ireland
Parameters as used by: β γ 1979-82 1983-97 1998-2004 
Taylor (1993) 1.500 0.500 –12.54 4.30 –4.00 
Honohan-Lane (2003) 1.500 0.125 –12.25 3.57 –3.08 
Fed St Louis (2002) 1.248 0.853 –8.64 5.43 –4.47 
Fed St Louis (2002) 1.846 1.073 –18.74 4.79 –5.93   
Quarterly data from the sources used for Figure 3. The target long-term nominal
interest rate α is set at 4.
14A technical caveat must be entered in regard to these measures: standard tests cannot reject the
existence of a unit root in the nominal interest rate. If a quadratic deterministic trend is assumed,
however, a cointegrating vector linking the three main variables: the interest rate, inflation rate
and output gap is found (Johansen test rejects the alternative of no cointegration). Given the lack
of power of unit root tests on short samples, as well as a relatively strong theoretical presumption
that, even if nominal interest rates are non-stationary, they could likely be cointegrated with
inflation if real interest rates are stationary, it seems acceptable to report levels regressions as in
Table 2.
15Regression 1 in Table 2 shows that, in the narrow band ERM period, before the crisis of 1992-3,
inflation was significant, with an estimated long-term adjustment coefficient β/α of 0.4. But for
this period, defense of exchange rate peg was an important influence on interest rate policy.
Indeed, in the narrow-band period there was a positive correlation between real exchange rate
appreciation and the level of the real interest rate – a correlation which no longer prevails.
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Table 2: Fitting a Taylor Model to Irish Interest Rate Data Quarterly 1980-2004
Dependent Variable is Level of Short-Term Nominal Interest Rate
1 2 3
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t
Constant 3.62 3.6 0.165 0.5 0.99 0.6
4-qrtr inflation 0.169 3.1 –0.026 0.3 0.251 2.1
Output gap (OECD) –0.040 0.4 0.027 0.8 0.166 3.6
Lagged interest rate 0.592 5.8 0.955 15.3 0.279 1.9
AR(1) 0.94 21.3
AR(2)
Lag on infl/gap 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sample 80:2-92:2 93:4-04:4 93:4-04:4
RSQ/DW 0.792 1.74 0.872 1.46 0.916 1.85
β / γ 0.41 –0.10 –0.57 0.61 0.35 0.23 
4 5 6
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t
Constant 2.49 2.1 4.35 7.4 3.44 4.6 
4-qrtr inflation –0.018 0.1 0.362 1.9 0.638 2.8 
Output gap (OECD) 0.066 1.0 0.110 2.1 0.181 3.4 
Lagged interest rate 0.612 3.1 0.181 3.0 0.277 2.9 
AR(1)  0.80 3.6 0.38 1.4 
AR(2)  –0.60 3.3 –0.40 2.7
Lag on infl/gap 0 0 0 0 –1 0
Sample 93:4-97:4 93:4-97:4 93:4-97:4 
RSQ/DW 0.446 1.25 0.790 2.02 0.806 2.36 
β / γ –0.05 0.17 0.44 0.14 0.88 0.25 
7 8 9 10  
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t
Constant 0.91 5.1 0.91 3.7 0.71 3.9 0.97 3.1
4-qrtr inflation 0.159 3.8 0.155 2.6 0.169 4.0 0.192 2.7
Output gap (OECD) 0.168 7.0 0.169 6.1 0.152 5.6 0.123 2.5
Lagged interest rate 0.385 6.7 0.387 3.3 0.440 8.4 0.360 3.6
AR(1) 0.03 0.1
AR(2) –0.02 0.2
Lag on infl/gap 0 0 0 0 –1 0 0 1
Sample 98:4-04:4 98:4-04:4 98:4-04:4 98:4-04:4
RSQ/DW 0.938 1.35 0.938 1.41 0.943 1.76 0.840 1.63
β / γ 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.19 
Note: Data from OECD Economic Outlook No. 77. Estimation is by ordinary least
squares. The entries “Lag on infl/gap” indicate by how many quarters the inflation rate,
and the output gap, are lagged.
(Regression 3), but the major explanatory power comes from the
autoregression, and the estimated values of the coefficients β and γ are low.
The low value of the inflation response β in particular (less than 0.4) contrasts
with the experience for other small countries, as indicated by the panel
regression of the same form reported in Honohan and Leddin (2005). 
Looking separately at the wide-band ERM period,16 inflation and the
output gap are once again not significant unless autoregressive terms are
included. If we do include autoregressive terms, then inflation and output gap
become significant, though again with a small inflation response coefficient,
the highest estimated value of β being the 0.88 of Regression 6. Once again
this contrasts with the results from a panel of small countries.
In the EMU period both inflation and output gap are significant. As we
know that Irish macroeconomic conditions have a negligible effect on ECB
policy, the significant coefficients here may be considered as induced from the
correlation with EMU-wide macroeconomic conditions. For Ireland in EMU
this equation can at most be described as a pseudo- or “as if” Taylor rule.
Higher Irish inflation and higher Irish output (actually output gap) were
actually associated with higher interest rates, even though the Irish data were
not driving the policy. Curiously, then, interest rate movements during EMU
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Figure 4: Ireland: Real Interest Rates 1983-2004 (deflated by 4-quarter future
inflation)
Source: Based on data from Central Bank of Ireland Quarterly Bulletin.
16Here defined as ending in the last quarter of 1997, reflecting the generally accepted observation
that a change in regime emerged during 1998 with the approach of EMU. Note that by estimating
the subperiods separately, we allow the intercept of the Taylor equation to differ, so that on
average this allows the actual interest rate to have been “right” on average. 
can just as easily – or even more easily – be interpreted as moving in a
counterinflationary and countercyclical way on average. However, for the
EMU period also, the estimated coefficients are too small to imply a vigorous
counterinflationary policy response. While the estimated value of the output
response coefficient γ at about 0.2-0.3 is within the range discussed in the
literature, the response to inflation, β = 0.3, is well below unity (Regressions
7-10).
Before rushing to the conclusion that neither before nor since the
beginning of EMU has monetary policy been sufficiently stabilising, there are
some further caveats. For one thing, the inflation surge of 2000-3 was over by
2004 and at the time of writing inflation is down to about 21⁄2 per cent. In
retrospect the sharp upward jag in policy rates advocated by the Taylor rule
(to over 14 per cent by the end of 2000) would surely have been an
overreaction. This alerts us to the possibility that the relative weight given to
inflation and the output gap in the Taylor rule parameters may be
inappropriate for an environment where medium-term inflation stability is
guaranteed by the nominal anchor of using an external currency. Perhaps a
lower relative inflation sensitivity would be tolerable in such an environment,
though this would depend on the implications for future output gap of
tolerating a larger interim inflation, and on the elasticity of inflationary
expectations. Given that drift in the price level must ultimately be reversed it
may be more important to avoid an initial deviation because of the future cost
in output gap as inflation readjusts. On the other hand, a lower elasticity of
inflation expectations (less danger of an inflation psychology taking grip) may
make the reversal of a price blip less costly in output terms. 
This section has measured exchange rate shocks to nominal exchange
rates in terms of standard deviations of the NEER, and interest rate shocks in
terms of their deviations from a Taylor rule. Anyone who thought EMU would
bring a substantial improvement on either of these fronts will find little
comfort in the data. It would be hard to argue, though, that either source of
shock has markedly increased, with the one important exception of the sharp,
once-for-all drop in nominal interest rates – to levels well below what the
Taylor rule would imply. The effects of this fall are discussed in the next
section. 
IV A MODEL OF SHOCK TRANSMISSION EMBODYING 
MIGRATION AND CONSTRUCTION 
Having considered the role of shocks arising from exogenous interest rate
and exchange rate movements, we turn now to look at the market response of
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endogenous variables. Which of the main variables has been the most
responsive, and have there been evident changes in the degree to which these
responses occur? 
In this section we use a simple model to provide an interpretation of the
way in which the Irish economy has adapted to EMU-related shocks, with very
slow adjustment of wage competitiveness, and overshooting in the property
and construction market and in migration. The model is specifically
constructed to capture these two specific issues relevant to the Irish economy’s
response to shocks post-EMU.17 Migration needs to be covered because of the
exceptionally open nature of Ireland’s labour market, and property/
construction because of the size of the interest rate shock and its impact on
housing affordability. The model shows how the amplitude of systemic
response may change, depending on which of these channels are open.
The full model is set out in the Appendix, together with some simulation
plots. Briefly, there are seven equations, modelling wages, the prices of goods
and housing, labour demand and migration, the stock of housing and expected
price inflation. The wage rate evolves in response to expected inflation and
towards an equilibrium relationship between the real wage and employment
ratio. Following Gali and Gertler (1999), the price of goods is modelled as a
variable mark-up on wage and import price costs, again with a lagged
adjustment; the variation in the mark-up depends on expected inflation. The
modelling of relative house prices is based on affordability (wages relative to
interest costs) and on the stock supply. Residential construction investment
continues as long as there is a gap between house prices and the general price
level. Employment and output are demand-determined, influenced by
international competitiveness, and by house prices (reflecting both a wealth
effect and also construction demand), again with a lag. Migration is captured
by assuming that the labour force adjusts to close partially the gap between
labour demand and supply.18 Expected price inflation is very simply modelled
as a lagged partial adjustment to actual inflation.
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17Duffy, FitzGerald and Kearney (2005) also model the interaction between migration and
construction in Ireland; though their goal is to examine longer-term equilibrium, and they use
consistent annual data to estimate the equations. Despite significant differences of detail, there is
a family resemblance between the two modelling approaches. Our model is focused on short-term
dynamic adjustment and in this respect draws on the work of Deroose et al. (2004) whose model
is designed for analysis of shocks in the EMU, but who do not model migration or the property
market. (Another example of this type of work, with application to Spain, is in Lopez-Salido et al.,
2005). 
18A further refinement would be to differentiate between the migration responses of high- and low-
skilled workers as in Bergin and Kearney (2004) who assume that only the former migrate and
only the latter suffer unemployment, cf. Fitz Gerald and Kearney (2000) and Duffy et al. (2005) .
The ESRI modellers also have migration depending on relative wages rather than excess labour
market demand.
As a result of the interaction of lagged adjustments in different markets,
models of this type typically predict an adjustment path of prices and
quantities that may cycle around the equilibrium, initially overshooting it.19
Our model is no exception in this respect.  Interestingly, for the parameters
with which we have simulated the model, the impact of a change in interest
rates is most conspicuous at first in house prices, followed by wages, and lastly
by consumer prices. The low amplitude of the movement in consumer prices
reflects the model’s assumption that import prices anchor a large component
of consumer prices and that substitution in the product market between
imports and local production is high. The initial surge in house prices
promotes construction demand and this encourages in-migration, which in
turn adds to the demand pressures, though allowing wages to fall back. The
potentially protracted nature of this adjustment is evident from the
simulations and from the inevitable lags that will be involved in each of the
elements. Relative house prices remain high for a long time, even though we
have modelled the negative feedback from the accumulating housing stock
onto housing prices.
If there were no property market and no migration, the pattern of effects
would be quite different. Absent the property market, employment and wages
would not rise by so much and the effects would be shorter in duration.
Migration has the effect of dampening the wage response, but it increases the
duration of the output and employment effect. The simulations reported in the
Appendix confirm this intuition. While parametric, the average nominal
exchange rate for Ireland against its trading partners is not fixed in the new
regime, and this induces shocks to prices and competitiveness that need to be
factored-in. In our model, this comes through the import price variable. The
consequences for the economy of a rise in import prices are clear enough:
competitiveness improves, resulting in an increase in wages and net immigra-
tion, as well as higher house prices and construction activity, and higher
output generally. The theoretical model thus reveals how, with slow and
imperfect macroeconomic adjustment, the initial interest rate shock had the
potential to create a sustained construction-led boom with a positive feedback
through migration, even despite exchange rate induced losses of competitive-
ness. In the remaining sections, we present empirical evidence on the
evolution of these key variables, showing how actual movements do seem to
correspond broadly to the model’s predictions, and highlighting in particular
the slowness of wage adjustment to losses of international competitiveness.
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19The literature on how some markets will over-react if others are constrained from clearing has
a long pedigree going back at least to Samuelson. In the open economy macro literature,
Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting model has been adapted to many different contexts, and its
microfoundations strengthened (cf Hau, 2000; Lane, 2001, Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).
V ENDOGENOUS RESPONSES IN PRACTICE
The model of the previous section is, of course, too schematic to capture
much of the detail of Ireland’s empirical experience. Yet when we look at the
empirical counterparts of the model’s main variables we find important
confirming evidence of the mechanisms described. In particular, we note
(following the very large initial fall in interest rates, concentrated in 1998) a
dramatic increase in the relative price of property, a sharp upturn in
construction activity, unprecedented immigration, and comparatively little
evidence of adjustment in wages.  In Section 5.1 we briefly document the first
two of these developments, turning to migration in Section 5.2 and to the
evolution of international wage competitiveness before and since the start of
EMU in Section 5.3.
5.1 Housing
The surge in residential property prices has been widely discussed (and
subjected to econometric analysis, e.g., Roche (2003)). In a period of
widespread property booms worldwide, Ireland’s experience still stands out as,
on at least some measures, the strongest boom. Figure 5 shows a long time
series of residential property prices deflated by the consumer price index; even
with this deflation, the exceptional nature of recent house price movements
can be clearly seen. A major driving factor has been the fall in nominal and
real interest rates, which can be seen either as inverse capitalisation factors,
or inverse measures of affordability. The fall in nominal interest rates was
most pronounced in 1998, the year of most rapid house price increase. 
In addition to the price increase, there has been a surge in construction
activity, just as predicted by the model. Even relying on data in the Labour
Force Survey (ILO basis), the percentage of workers reported in the building
sector has jumped from between 6 and 7 per cent, where it stood from 1990 to
1997, to over 11 per cent by 2004. Increased use of contract workers may mean
that the latter figure is understated. Indeed, the increased reliance of the
economy on the construction sector has become one of the most distinctive
aspects of the economic expansion as it has matured since the effects of EMU
began to have an impact. An important aspect of euro membership for the
construction sector is that, in contrast to the narrow-band ERM period when
the authorities routinely increased rates to defend an overvalued exchange
rate peg, real interest rates are no longer positively correlated with the real
exchange rate. As a consequence, the construction sector is more insulated
than before from external competitiveness shocks.
Whereas exchange rate and inflation expectations have been stabilised by
EMU, the potential of destabilising expectations about the relative price of
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housing/property markets still remains, and indeed this sector may
increasingly have become the focus of such destabilising expectations. 
5.2 Migration
The relatively modest response of real wages (discussed in 5.3 below) to
the initial favourable shocks likely reflects the sizeable migration flows that
have occurred.20 Inward migration in each of the years 2000-2004 was
between 1⁄2 and 1 per cent of population, and exceeded that for any other year
on record (Figure 6). And these have also been the years in which the Irish
unemployment rate has fallen below that of the UK for the first time. The
surge in migration is very striking: it appears that the labour market has
adjusted through quantity movements and not only through prices. But it is
not evident from the data that this reflects an autonomous surge in migration
behaviour. To be sure, there are novel elements in recent migration flows, but
the point here is that much of the additional inflows can be explained purely
in terms of an endogenous adjustment of the labour market. For instance,
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Figure 5: New House Prices as a Multiple of CPI (Index, 1970=1)
Source: Based on Department of the Environment Housing Statistics Bulletin.
20Reflecting the openness of the Irish labour market, some relationships observed in other
countries have not been present in the Irish data, whether before or since the start of EMU.
Specifically, Irish unemployment does not appear to be closely and reliably related to wage
inflation over the period (Phillips Curve, cf. Curtis and Fitz Gerald, 1996; Walsh, 2000). Nor does
Irish unemployment correlate well on a short-term (e.g. quarterly) basis with GNP growth (Okun’s
law), though Walsh (2004) has pointed out that, over a long annual time series period (1961-2000),
a significant correlation is obtained. 
Figure 7 plots net immigration against the Ireland-UK unemployment
differential and shows that recent observations (the six at the upper left) are
close to the a regression line drawn for data from the previous four decades (cf.
Honohan and Walsh, 2002). 
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Figure 6: Net Migration in Thousands, 1950-2004
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute Database of Economic Time Series
Version NIE03, 2005.
Figure 7: Migration and Unemployment Differentials.
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute Database of Economic Time Series
Version NIE03, 2005.
EMU observations marked with square box.
5.3 Wage Competitiveness
Wage competitiveness is clearly the key relative price for macroeconomic
purposes. In this subsection we briefly describe recent trends in international
wage relatives for Ireland. We find no indication that wage competitiveness is
a stable, self-correcting process. Three distinct elements contribute to short-
run fluctuations in wage competitiveness: Irish wage rates, foreign wage rates
and exchange rates.21 The dynamics of each are distinct. Foreign wage
movements can be regarded as exogenous to the Irish economy. Exchange
rates are now also exogenous (as discussed above), but before EMU, the DM
peg was adjusted from time-to-time in a way which did respond to Irish
macroeconomic conditions (Honohan, 1993). Now it is only the nominal wages
that can adjust and the speed of adjustment of wage competitiveness to shocks
therefore indirectly measures the speed of nominal wage adjustment to a loss
of wage competitiveness. Irish wages are themselves subject to a series of
bargaining procedures, at centralised national and decentralised levels
(Walsh, 2004). 
It is well understood that comparisons based on unit labour costs are
inappropriate in any data including aggregate manufacturing in Ireland
because of the distortions to the measurement of productivity related to low
wage share (transfer pricing) sectors (Honohan and Walsh, 2002). Therefore,
hourly or weekly wage costs are generally considered the most appropriate
basis for tracking short-term changes in the average competitiveness of Irish
workers. Unfortunately, official data on aggregate Irish wage competitiveness
(measured against trading partners) have, over the years, been remarkably
thin and problematic, partly due to the weakness of high-frequency aggregate
wage rate data.22 Indeed, the annual series published by the Department of
Finance and by the Central Bank of Ireland diverge inexplicably at some
points (especially at 1985-6 and again in 1996-7) and, since the trade weights
for both have never been published, it has not been possible to pin down the
reason for the discrepancy. 
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the wage competitiveness indexes from the
two sources. Regardless of the differences, it is clear from both series that an
upward trend (loss of competitiveness) over the previous ten years was
interrupted in the mid-1980s for at least a decade. This must have contributed
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21Of course productivity and quality issues are also crucial, but we leave those in the background
for this discussion. For one thing, in Ireland, aggregate measured average labour productivity in
manufacturing moves sharply depending on changes in the relative output of low wage-share
sectors such as pharmaceuticals, IT equipment and software-related manufactures, without these
shifts necessarily reflecting any change in marginal labour productivity.
22Even for changes; the question of levels is even more difficult, see Fitz Gerald (2005), who
stresses the importance of disaggregating wage changes in Ireland in the past decade as between
low-skill and high-skill.
strongly to the employment surge of the Celtic Tiger period. (Honohan-Walsh,
2002). Since 2000, however, competitiveness has been lost rather severely.
There is no evidence here of a self-correcting process. For one thing,
existence of a unit root cannot be rejected for this data (not surprising for such
a short data series). Alternatively, if we assume a common quadratic time
trend through the whole period, and estimate a simple autoregressive
adjustment process, the results suggest that the adjustment process did exist
before 1998, but not since. Specifically, estimating 
∆w = λ(1 – θD)(α0 – α1T + α2 T2 – w–1), 
where D is an EMU dummy, we obtain λ = 0.648 (t = 2.9); θ = 1.32 (t = 6.5),
with an R-squared of 0.365 and a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.88, for the
maximal sample period 1976-2004. The estimated coefficient θ is greater than
unity (and significantly greater than 0.9) implies that at least 90 per cent of
the adjustment parameter is eroded in the EMU period.
Of course, rising wages, if sustainable, are a good thing, and the present
discussion cannot claim to have proved that the sharp upward trend in wages
was greater than could be supported by underlying productivity growth (a
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Figure 8: Aggregate Index of Wage Competitiveness vs. Main Trading Partners:
Two Sources
Source: Central Bank of Ireland and Department of Finance. The latter ends in 2001,
but is continued by using the same source’s figures for UK, US and Germany, weighted
0.19, 0.25 and 0.56 respectively. 
topic which goes beyond the scope of this paper). However the indications, both
from visual inspection of the runaway trend, and from simple regression
models, is of an adjustment process for wage competitiveness which has lost
all traction in these early years of EMU. Absent continued lucky breaks in
other dimensions, this is something which will have to change if unpleasant
costs are not to be incurred. 
VI  CONCLUDING REMARKS
We began with two questions: are exogenous shocks to the Irish economy
larger in EMU and how have the economy’s endogenous responses to shocks
changed as a result of the regime change? Our conclusion on shocks is that
these have not on balance increased by much. There may have been a slight
increase in exchange rate volatility. At first sight, short-run effective exchange
rate index volatility seems, if anything, to fall during EMU, but closer
inspection shows that this is because of the contribution of corrective
realignments in the earlier period. Furthermore, the amplitude of the low-
frequency oscillation during the EMU period is higher than was normal
before.
The interest rate story also suggests little systematic increase in the level
of shocks. Interest rates have not been appropriate to local conditions during
EMU, but that was also true for different reasons in the previous exchange
rate regimes. We have assessed shocks here by comparing actual interest rates
to those which would be generated by a Taylor rule for Ireland. By this
standard, interest rates were much too high on average in the ERM period,
reflecting agency costs (e.g., the market’s fear of an inflationary strategy to
solve the problem of high government debt, and its fear that the authorities
would pursue an overly devaluationist response to sterling weakness). While
there is a long-term benefit to Ireland from the removal of the risk premium
that kept interest rates so high in the ERM period, the fall in interest rates
has, in the early years of EMU, pushed them below where they should have
been for stabilisation purposes according to the Taylor criterion. 
Turning from the average level of interest rates to their responsiveness to
output gaps and inflation, the ERM period also showed a lack of monetary
policy response. Curiously, although interest rates in EMU are not set in
response to Irish conditions, the data fit a pseudo-Taylor rule with significant
responses to inflation and output gaps. This relationship is presumably
induced by the correlation of Irish conditions in the sample period with the
EMU-wide factors driving ECB policy. To what extent this correlation is
fortuitous, and to what extent structural, is not known. Anyway, the size of the
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response of the pseudo-Taylor rule to inflation is too small (about 0.3) to be
sufficiently stabilising in itself.
As to the adjustment of the remainder of the economy, we have stressed
the substantial role of the housing market both in prices and in activity. In
particular, the initial fall in real interest rates had its most dramatic effect on
the property market and especially on residential property prices. As predicted
by our simple model, this price effect was transmitted to activity, with the
result that the strong aggregate output performance (which has both
encouraged and been fed by migration flows) has been increasingly
construction-led largely explaining the resilience of economic activity into
2005. Adjustment mechanisms in the labour market seem to have been weak.
There is evidence that international wage competitiveness was maintained
through an adjustment process around a time trend in the ERM period. But
since EMU began, there is no sign of the adjustment mechanism persisting.
Indeed, the lack of responsiveness of competitiveness indicators to weakening
employment conditions is striking. Instead of wage-price responses, migration
flows have continued to represent the major form of labour market
adjustment.
The loss of wage competitiveness since the start of EMU has been quite
sharp. Against the US, the loss has averaged 3.3 per cent per annum – with
earlier gains partly offsetting a more dramatic fall since 2002; against
Germany, the loss has averaged 2.1 per cent per annum. The sustainability of
such losses must be doubted. Despite the loss of competitiveness, exports have
continued to surge, growing by 11.9 per cent in 2004. However, these data
undoubtedly contain a certain amount of momentum reflecting earlier capital
formation. Calculations in European Commission (2005) showing that Ireland
lost export market share in each sector in recent years, but benefited from its
concentration in sectors whose world market was growing, are particularly
worrying in this context. The fall in interest rates has unleashed a long-lived
property price and construction-led boom which, interacting with long-
standing migration forces in a manner modelled by our theoretical model,
explains why losses of wage competitiveness have not yet been followed by a
downturn in employment as has been feared for several years now (cf. Bergin
et al. 2003; Leddin, 2001). As this positive force finally abates, the absence of
effective wage adjustment mechanisms suggests that the prospect of a lengthy
period of labour market weakness cannot be ruled out.
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APPENDIX: 
A SIMPLE DYNAMIC MODEL
A simple algebraic model of price and wage dynamics, such as has recently
been used to simulate the differential impact of shocks on different euro-zone
economies (cf. Deroose et al. 2004), can be adapted23 to show the role of the
construction industry and migration in an economy such as that of Ireland
where these have proved important in the EMU years. Recently, Duffy et al.
(2005) have also modelled the interaction between migration and house prices
for Ireland, and there are significant similarities in the modelling, albeit their
approach has a longer-term perspective in contrast to the current exercise
designed to illustrate short-term fluctuations and interaction between the
sectors.
Four prices are important: w, the nominal wage rate; p, the price of goods;
ph, the price of housing; p*, the exogenous price of foreign goods. The level of
employment n and the labour force l, and the housing stock h are stock
variables, the latter two to be taken as slowly-evolving state variables as we
will see. All these variables expressed in logs. The inflation rate is written
πt+1 = pt+1 – pt and superscript e denotes the expectation (at the previous period
– i.e. pet+1 is the expectation at time t of the price at time t+1); the nominal
interest rate (not logs) is r.
The nominal wage rate evolves in response to expected inflation
movements towards an equilibrium relationship between the real wage and
employment ratio:
wt = wt–1 + α1(pte – pt–1) + α2[α3(nt–1 – lt–1) – (wt–1 – pt–1)] (1)  
The price of goods is modelled as a variable mark-up on costs: the costs are
modelled as a fix-weight average of wages and import prices; the mark-up
increases with higher expected inflation (Gali-Gertler, 1999). Even though the
Gali-Gertler story already embodies staggered price-setting, we follow Deroose
et al., in allowing gradual adjustment to the modelled mark-up.
pi = νpt–1 + (1 – ν)[λ1wt + (1 – λ1)ptm + λ2(pte – pt–1)] (2) 
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23The main differences with Deroose et al. are as follows: (i) whereas they treat interest rate
movements as having a generalised demand effect, we model the construction sector separately
thereby allowing a distinct interest rate effect, and revealing housing price dynamics; (ii) we allow
the labour force to evolve in response to real wage differentials; (iii) we include a housing wealth
term in lieu of net foreign assets (as we regard the latter as too slow-moving to have interesting
short-term dynamics; (iv) we do not include the quadratic inflation term in the price equation. 
As a long-lived asset, the fundamental price of housing is often modelled
as being determined by the discounted present value of future rentals and
terminal resale value. The future resale price is hard for the market
participant and for the modeller to determine with any precision, and the
degree to which a bubble might also be present in the actual price is widely
studied (for the Irish context, see Roche, 2003). Furthermore, myopia, liquidity
constraints and transactions costs can make short-term considerations of
affordability and user demand equally, or more relevant to short-term price
determination, as well as being easier to model. The major elements of the
affordability calculation are aggregate wage income and the real interest rate
(during high inflation, nominal interest rate may be separately relevant). The
market-clearing price of housing will be higher, the higher the affordability
and the lower the stock of housing; this is the basis of Equation (3) (cf. Duffy
et al., 2005). In the present exercise, we do not attempt to include a term
capturing expectations of resale value.
pth = pt + β1(wt – pt + nt) – β2[rt – (pte – pt)] – β3ht–1 (3) 
Residential construction investment continues while the relative price of
housing is above its equilibrium value.24
ht = ht–1 + ξ(pht–1 – pt–1) (4) 
Ignoring issues of factor substitution, we will simply assume that
employment is proportional to aggregate output, and that the latter is demand
determined, influenced by international competitiveness (external demand),
and house prices (wealth effect and also construction demand – the parameter
from the construction Equation (4) reappears here). Inertial factors are also
influential. Government demand g is an additional, potentially endogenous
factor, included to flag also the many other exogenous elements which could be
added to a model for estimation (raw material costs, productivity changes etc).
nt = µnt–1 + (1 – µ)[(γ1 + ξ)(pht–1 – pt–1) – γ2(wt – ptm) + γ3 g] (5) 
A partial adjustment equation for the labour force is added, effectively
modelling migration. (Again we ignore the many other exogenous terms that
could be relevant – foreign wage rates, social benefits etc.)
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24Actually, this is more appropriate for the price of a new house on marginal land. Average house
prices will include location premia for the land. 
lt = lt–1 + ζ(nt–1 – lt–1) (6) 
In line with much of the recent literature, the role of rational expectations
is suppressed in the modelling of expected price inflation, for simplicity and
allowing greater clarity of the mechanisms with which we are chiefly
concerned here. Thus we base the calculations on the partial adjustment
mechanism, πte = π et–1 + ϕ(πt–1 – π et–1).
For constant values of the exogenous variables pm, r, and g, the steady-
state equilibrium of this system can be solved to yield:
w
∞
= p
∞
= p
∞
h = pm;
l
∞
= n
∞
= γ3g
h
∞
= [β1γ3g – β1r]/β3
Thus, the long-run labour force and employment is proportional to the
exogenous spending variable, the housing stock is also permanently
influenced by the interest rate. The nominal variables are homogeneous of
degree one in the exogenous import price. (These results reflect the medium-
term perspective in which no government balance sheet constraint is
imposed.)
Simulating this model reveals the reinforcing nature of the migration and
construction channels on the duration and magnitude of the boom resulting
from an initial fall in the nominal interest rate. Figures A1 (a-c) show the
simulated timepath of the variables. Time is on the horizontal axis; the
vertical axes show deviations from initial equilibrium. The scale and time
period is wholly notional – the main interest lies in the overall shape of the
simulations. Figures A2 (a-b) show how the time path of the real wage rate and
of employment or output vary depending on whether the migration or
construction channels are suppressed (ζ = 0, ξ =0, respectively). Here perhaps
is the key to extended duration of Ireland’s boom through the EMU years, an
interpretation which is supported by the very high share of output taken by
construction in recent years. Without migration and the construction channel,
wage rates and output could have been much lower.
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Figure A1: Simulated Effect of a Sustained Fall in Interest Rates
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure A2: Impact of a Fall in Interest Rates if Migration and Construction
Channels not Available
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Note: Parameter values: α1 = 0.9; α2 = 0.1; α3 = 0.1; β1 = 3; β2 = 20; β3 = 0.1; λ1 = λ2 = 0.1;
µ = 0.5; ν = 0.9; ψ = 0.9; ζ = 0.1; ξ = 0.1; r = –0.05; pm = 0.2. 
(a)
(b)
